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Abstract
Victor prefers safety more than Ursula if whenever Ursula prefers some constant
to some uncertain act, so does Victor. This paradigm, whose Expected Utility version
takes the form of Arrow & Pratt’s more risk averse concept under which Victor’s utility
v and Ursula’s utility u must be such that v(u−1(·)) is concave, will be studied in the
Choquet Uncertainty model, letting µ (ν) be Ursula’s (Victor’s) capacity.
A necessary and sufficient condition (A) on the pairs (u, µ) and (v, ν) will be
presented for dichotomous weak increased uncertainty aversion, the preference by Victor
of a constant over a dichotomous act whenever such is the preference of Ursula. This
condition, pointwise inequality between a function defined in terms of v(u−1(·)) and
another defined purely in terms of the capacities, preserves the flavor of the ”more
pessimism than greediness” characterization of monotone risk aversion by Chateauneuf,
Cohen & Meilijson in the Rank-dependent Utility Model and its extension by Grant &
Quiggin to the Choquet Utility Model.
A sufficient condition (B) in terms of the capacities only, satisfied in particular if
ν(·) = f(µ(·)) for some convex f , will be presented for simplicity seeking, the preference
by Victor over any act for some dichotomous act that leaves Ursula indifferent. Condition
A is thus a characterization of weak increased uncertainty aversion for convex f .
An example will be exhibited disproving the more far reaching conjecture under
which the dichotomous case implies the general case.
Keywords and Phrases: Choquet Utility, Greediness, Pessimism, Rank-dependent
Utility, Risk aversion, Uncertainty.
JEL Classification Numbers: D81
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1 Introduction
Risk aversion depends on the notion of risk applied: a dichotomy averse decision maker
(DM) prefers to every dichotomous random variable, its mean. A weakly risk averse DM
prefers to every integrable random variable, its mean. A strongly risk averse DM prefers less
risk to more risk in the sense of Mean-preserving increase in risk (MPIR; Hardy, Littlewood
& Polya [19], Rothschild & Stiglitz [27, 28]). A monotone risk averse DM prefers less risk
to more risk in the sense of Quiggin [25] (see also Bickel & Lehmann [1, 2]). The literature
contributes a number of in-between notions of risk and risk aversion, such as selective risk
aversion (Landsberger & Meilijson [21]) and Location-independent risk (Jewitt [20]).
In the von Neumann & Morgenstern expected utility (EU) setup the DM is fully
characterized by a utility function. Dichotomy aversion implies concavity of the utility
function, and this implies all other types of risk aversion listed above, rendering all equivalent
to each other, well represented by MPIR.
Degree of risk aversion is a more delicate concept in EU: the well accepted Arrow &
Pratt characterization of weak risk aversion applies to aversion to monotone risk (even in
the class of non-decreasing utility functions, Landsberger & Meilijson [22]) and to Location-
independent risk (in the class of concave non-decreasing utility functions, Jewitt [20]) but
not to MPIR (Ross [26]).
The rank-dependent expected utility model (RDU; Quiggin [24], Yaari [32]) replaces EU
by the more general RDU functional as an index of preference between measurable functions
(random variables, acts), in terms of a probability transformation function f that transforms
the distribution function F much in the same way the utility function transforms wealth.
The DM is characterized by the pair (utility function on wealth, probability transformation
function). RDU is expected utility taken with respect to the transformed distribution
function 1− f(1− F ).
In RDU, strong risk aversion is characterized by concavity of the utility function and
convexity of the probability transformation function (Chew, Karni & Safra [10]). While
monotone risk aversion with concave utility function is characterized by plain pessimism
(the transformed probability is first-degree dominated by the original probability; Quiggin
[24, 25]), it does not require concavity of the utility function and is characterized by ”more
pessimism than greediness” (Pf ≥ Gu; Chateauneuf, Cohen & Meilijson [9]), in terms of a
scalar index of pessimism (Pf ≥ 1) derived from the probability transformation function and
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a scalar index of greediness (or non-concavity Gu ≥ 1) derived from the utility function.
After establishing that Gu = 1 if and only if u is concave and Pf = 1 for linear f , this
characterization is seen to generalize the role played by concavity in EU and in Chew,
Karni & Safra’s result for RDU.
Since EU and RDU assume a bona-fide distribution, EU and RDU are indices under risk.
In the Choquet uncertainty model (CEU) (Schmeidler [29, 30]), the DM is characterized by
a utility function on wealth and a Choquet capacity [11], a monotone but not necessarily
additive set function, normalized so as to assign value 0 to the empty set and 1 to the
whole space. Acts are compared by Choquet integrals of the utility function with respect to
the capacity. This setup models uncertainty, wherein the DM doesn’t necessarily specify a
probability measure on events. In contrast, RDU and EU model probability sophistication,
via a well specified probability measure on events.
Under uncertainty, there is no conceivably proper notion of uncertainty aversion, since
there is no objective nor subjective probability measure to serve as anchor for the evaluation
of an expectation. The closest natural notion we tried, the Shapley value of the coalition
game defined by the capacity, proved inadequate.
Earlier attempts by Chateauneuf & Cohen [6] to characterize weak risk aversion produced
necessary conditions on the one hand and sufficient conditions (allowing non-concave u) on
the other, but no characterization.
The key in Epstein [16], Ghirardato & Marinacci [17] and Grant & Quiggin’s [18]
approaches has been to extend from risk to uncertainty the notion of more risk averse
rather than that of risk averse. Grant & Quiggin’s (GQ; [18]) lifted comparative pessimism
and greediness analysis from RDU to CEU by interpreting a monotone risk averse DM as
one that is monotone more risk averse than a risk neutral DM. Victor (with utility function
v and capacity ν) is monotone more uncertainty averse than Ursula (u and µ) if Victor
always prefers monotone less uncertainty that leaves Ursula indifferent. The GQ relative
index of pessimism of ν with respect to µ is roughly defined as the CCM index of pessimism,
letting µ take the role of the probability measure and ν that of the transformed probability
measure. Similarly, the GQ index of relative concavity of v with respect to u is defined
as the CCM index of greediness of w(·) = v(u−1(·)). Grant & Quiggin proved that Victor
is monotone more uncertainty averse than Ursula if and only if Victor is relatively more
pessimistic than greedy with respect to Ursula.
3
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This state of affairs is awkward: we understand the elaborate notions of strong and
monotone risk and uncertainty aversion as well as some other stochastic variations, but not
yet the most natural, Arrow & Pratt-type elementary notion of weak risk and uncertainty
aversion, the preference for safety: Victor is weakly more uncertainty averse than Ursula
if whenever Ursula prefers some constant to some uncertain act, so does Victor. It seems
easier to study stochastic orders with simple progressive generators that allow analysis to
transit from less risk to more risk by well understood simple spreads, than it is to transit
from risk to safety in one daring jump.
Monotone risk aversion implies weak risk aversion and monotone more
uncertainty aversion implies monotone more weak uncertainty aversion, so the necessary and
sufficient conditions for the monotonicity versions are sufficient conditions for the weakness
versions. Examples provided in the sequel will show that these are not necessary.
Concentrating on two-valued acts, a characterization will be provided for dichotomous
weak risk (and increasing uncertainty) aversion, in terms of a lower envelope function LEw
that depends on u and v only (via w(·) = v(u−1(·))), and a capacity transformation function
fµ,ν depending on µ and ν only. Both are increasing functions from [0, 1] to itself, that leave
the endpoints invariant: fµ,ν(q) is the supremum of ν(A) taken over all A with µ(A) ≤ q.
LEw(x) is the infimum over all a < b of wa,b(x), where the ”zooms” wa,b of w are defined
by wa,b(x) =
w(a+x(b−a))−w(a)
w(b)−w(a) .
We will prove that Victor is dichotomous weakly more uncertainty averse than Ursula if
and only if fµ,ν ≤ LEw (pointwise). Furthermore, if fµ,ν ≤ g ≤ LEw for some convex g (in
particular, if either LEw or fµ,ν is convex), Victor is weakly more uncertainty averse than
Ursula. This statement holds also under the weaker assumption of separation by semi-
convex g (a notion to be introduced) as a sufficient condition for simplicity seeking, the
preference by Victor over every distribution for some dichotomous distribution that leaves
Ursula indifferent.
These are functional conditions that postulate pointwise inequality between functions
(such as the Arrow-Pratt index or the integral condition for second degree dominance),
unlike the scalar condition for monotone more uncertainty aversion above, that postulate a
much simpler inequality between two numbers. The conditions are similar in the sense that
each compares an object defined in terms of w only (that measures departure from concavity)
with another defined in terms of fµ,ν only (that measures departure from linearity).
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The lower envelope function LEw can’t be any increasing function. However, self-
zooming functions (LEw ≡ w) trivially belong to the class. Via a deep connection between
this setup and the casino theory of Dubins & Savage ([15], Theorem 4.2.1. and expression
4.2.8), self-zooming functions are precisely those that can be obtained as the optimal
probability U(·) of reaching the goal in subfair casinos. The U function of Red & Black
casino will be shown to provide a counterexample to the plausible conjecture that
dichotomous weak uncertainty aversion implies weak uncertainty aversion. However, the
method of proof of the theorem (Dubins [13], Smith [31]) claiming that ”there is no
advantage in ever placing a bet on more than one hole on any single spin of the roulette
wheel”, will be applied to show that semi-convex fµ,ν satisfy the conjecture.
When the capacity transformation function fµ,ν is the identity (i.e., ν ≡ µ), the statement
fµ,ν ≤ LEw holds if and only if w is concave. This argument provides a re-derivation of the
Arrow-Pratt characterization of weak or increasing weak risk aversion under EU. Thus, the
conditions for dichotomous or more general weak uncertainty aversion presented here, lift
the Pratt paradigm from EU to CEU.
2 The main results
This paper deals with three concepts: weak increasing uncertainty aversion (or increasing
preference for safety versus uncertain acts), dichotomous weak increasing uncertainty
aversion (or increasing preference for safety versus dichotomous acts) and simplicity-seeking
preferences (or preference over any uncertain act of some dichotomous act).
Dichotomous increasing uncertainty aversion. Let (u, µ) and (v, ν) be the utility
functions and Choquet capacities of two CEU DM’s Ursula and Victor. Victor is more
averse to dichotomous acts versus safety than Ursula if for dichotomous acts X with payoff
x3 on A and x1 otherwise, the inequality
u(x1) + µ(A)(u(x3)− u(x1)) ≤ u(x2) , x1 < x2 < x3 (1)
implies
v(x1) + ν(A)(v(x3)− v(x1)) ≤ v(x2) (2)
that is, if whenever Ursula prefers a constant x2 to X, so does Victor. Rephrasing these
inequalities using the shorthand ui = u(xi) and w(u(·)) = v(·), if µ(A) ≤ u2−u1u3−u1 implies
5
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ν(A) ≤ w(u2)−w(u1)w(u3)−w(u1) . Define the capacity transformation function fµ,ν : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] by
fµ,ν(q) = sup
{A|µ(A)≤q}
ν(A) (3)
and the lower envelope function LEw : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] by
LEw(q) = inf
{u1<u2<u3|u2−u1u3−u1=q}
w(u2)− w(u1)
w(u3)− w(u1) (4)
to then rephrase the characterization of Victor as being more averse to dichotomous acts
versus safety than Ursula if and only if fµ,ν ≤ LEw.
Theorem 1 Victor is more averse to dichotomous acts versus safety than Ursula if and
only if fµ,ν ≤ LEw.
The lower envelope function. To better understand the lower envelope function, observe
that wa,b(q) =
w(a+q(b−a))−w(a)
w(b)−w(a) is obtained by zooming the graph of w on [a, b] so as to
fit exactly in the unit square. The lower envelope function is, as its name suggests, the
pointwise infimum of all of these zooms.
LEw(q) = inf
a<b
wa,b(q) (5)
Proposition 1 Let LEw be the lower envelope function of a continuous and strictly
increasing function w. Then
(i) LEw(x) ≤ x for all x ∈ [0, 1], LEw(0) = 0 and LEw(1) = 1.
(ii) LEw(x) = x for some x ∈ (0, 1)⇔ LEw(x) = x for all x ∈ [0, 1]⇔ w is concave.
(iii) LEw can be either the indicator function of {1}, the identity function LEw(x) ≡ x
or else is non-decreasing and continuous, with 0 < LEw(x) < x for all x ∈ (0, 1).
(iv) If w is differentiable, defined on a bounded closed interval, LEw is strictly increasing
and self-zooming.
Remark: For concave w the condition fµ,ν ≤ LEw simply states that µ must majorize ν
(∀A, ν(A) ≤ µ(A)). Thus, {i} if µ = ν is a probability measure, this is the Arrow & Pratt
characterization of ”more risk averse” - concavity of w - and {ii} if µ 6= ν are probability
measures, Victor can’t be more risk averse than Ursula. Our main objective is to study
increased preference for safety when w is not concave.
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Proof of Proposition 1: The lower envelope function LEw is the identity function
LEw(q) = q if and only if w is concave. Indeed, if w is not concave then there is a triple
a < c = a + q(b − a) < b such that (LEw(q) ≤)w(c)−w(a)w(b)−w(a) < q. The other direction holds
because w(c)−w(a)w(b)−w(a) ≥ c−ab−a = q can be made arbitrarily close to q by letting c be a point of
continuity of w in the interior of a small enough interval (a, b). This argument also shows
that LEw is bounded above by the identity function. LEw can certainly be zero everywhere
except for LEw(1) = 1. As will now be shown, except for these two extreme cases, LEw is
continuous, positive and below the identity function except at the endpoints. It will also
be shown under the further assumption that w is a differentiable function defined on some
bounded closed interval, that (i) except for the two extreme cases above, LEw is strictly
increasing, and (ii) LEw is self-zooming. These two properties may hold more generally,
but we don’t have a proof.
If w is continuous and strictly increasing but not concave, then there exist a < c < b
such that w(c) < b−cb−aw(a) +
c−a
b−aw(b). Furthermore, there exist a maximal a
′ ∈ [a, c) and
minimal b′ ∈ (c, b] such that w(a′) = b−a′b−a w(a) + a
′−a
b−a w(b) and w(c
′) = b−c
′
b−aw(a) +
c′−a
b−a w(b)
respectively. But then the zoom w[a′,c′] is strictly below the diagonal, whence so is LEw.
Hence, lower envelope functions are either linear (if and only if w is concave), or strictly
below the diagonal except at the endpoints. The other properties stated above follow from
the following Lemma 1.
Lemma 1 For all p and q in (0, 1),
LEw(pq) ≥ LEw(p)LEw(q) ; 1− LEw(pq) ≤ (1− LEw(p))(1− LEw(q)) (6)
Proof of Lemma 1:
w(a+ pq(b− a))− w(a)
w(b)− w(a) =
w(a+ pq(b− a))− w(a)
w(a+ p(b− a))− w(a)
w(a+ p(b− a))− w(a)
w(b)− w(a)
≥ LEw(q)w(a+ p(b− a))− w(a)
w(b)− w(a) ≥ LEw(q)LEw(p) (7)
from which it follows that LEpq, the infimum over [a, b] of the LHS of (7), is also above or
on the RHS. A dual inequality for 1− LEw is proved similarly.
Back to the proof of Proposition 1: Assume that LEw(q) > 0 for some q ∈ (0, 1). It
follows from the first inequality in (6) that for all n, LEw(qn) ≥ LEw(q)n. Hence, LEw is
strictly positive throughout (0, 1). The second inequality in (6) implies that 1−LEw(qn) ≤
7
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(1−LEw(q))n. Send q to 1 to obtain that for all n, 1−LEw(1−) ≤ (1−LEw(1−))n. Hence,
LEw(q−) = 1, or, LEw is continuous at 1. Now send p to 1 in the first inequality in (6) to
see that LEw is continuous everywhere.
Consider the zoom wa,b of w on an arbitrary interval [a, b]. Then (with LE = LEw)
LE(y)− LE(x)
LE(z)− LE(x) ≥
LE(y)− LE(x)
wa,b(z)− LE(x) ≥
LE(y)− wa,b(x)
wa,b(z)− wa,b(x)
=
wa,b(y)− wa,b(x)
wa,b(z)− wa,b(x) −
wa,b(y)− LE(y)
wa,b(z)− wa,b(x)
≥ LE(q)− wa,b(y)− LE(y)
wa,b(z)− wa,b(x) = LE(q)− RATIO (8)
where q = y−xz−x . To infer that LE is self-zooming, we must check that
LE(y)− LE(x)
LE(z)− LE(x) ≥ LE(q) (9)
Since (8) holds for all [a, b], suppose that the zoom on some [a, b] achieves the envelope
value at y. Then the numerator in RATIO is zero, the denominator is positive and we are
done. If LE(y) is an infimum over zooms, under the assumption that w is defined on a
bounded closed interval, any sequence [ai, bi] along which the infimum is achieved, has a
convergent subsequence. Clearly, the limit achieves the infimum as a minimum as long as
a = lim ai < lim bi = b. In this case, consider any z ∈ (0, y). Then LEw(z) ≤ wa,b(z) <
wa,b(y) = LEw(y), or, LEw is strictly increasing on [0, y].
Remark: There is a problem if a = b, that is, if LE(y) is achieved infinitesimally, because
then the numerator of RATIO may not go to zero faster than the denominator, in which
case RATIO would not go to zero. However, if w is differentiable everywhere and a = b
then LE(y) can only be y (the diagonal), a case we are not interested in, the concave case.
Simplicity seeking and semi convexity. Victor is a simplicity seeker with respect to
Ursula if for every act with finite support (say, S) composed of at least three points, there is
another act, supported by a strict subset of S, (weakly) preferred by Victor to the original
act but such that Ursula is indifferent between the two. The following Theorem 2 introduces
a sufficient condition in terms of fµ,ν for simplicity seeking. This condition deals with zooms
of the capacity transformation function fµ,ν of the same nature as in the construction of
the lower envelope of the utility transfer function w. It should be clear that if Victor,
8
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more averse to dichotomous acts versus safety than Ursula, is also a simplicity seeker with
respect to Ursula, then Victor prefers safety more than Ursula under general acts. This
is so because (by simplicity seeking) every act with finite support can be replaced by a
dichotomous act preferred by Victor and leaving Ursula indifferent, a setup in which the
second property takes over.
Consider the ”concentric” zooms Zg,q,r(∆) = gq−∆r,q+∆(1−r)(q) of g. g is semi-convex
if for every q, r ∈ (0, 1), Zg,q,r(·) is minimal at the maximal ∆, the one for which either
q −∆r = 0 or q +∆(1− r) = 1.
Lemma 2 Consider throughout the Lemma only ”g-functions”, i.e., continuous increasing
functions on [0, 1] with fixed points at the endpoints.
(i) Every convex g-function is semi-convex.
(ii) Every semi-convex g-function is star-shaped at 0 and at 1, i.e., g(x)x and
1−g(x)
1−x are
non-decreasing.
(iii) A g-function is star-shaped at 0 and at 1 if and only if it is a pointwise minimum
of some family of convex g-functions.
Proof. To prove (i), observe that if g is convex, Zg,q,r(·) is non-increasing. To prove (ii),
observe that by continuity of g, it is enough to show monotonicity at some arbitrary dense
set. Suppose the extreme ∆ occurs at q − ∆r = 0 and consider the dense set of points q
at which g is differentiable. At any such point, send ∆ to zero to obtain via Zg,q,r(0+) = r
that semi-convexity implies r ≥ g(q)
g( q
r
)
, or, g(q)q ≤
g( q
r
)
q
r
. Similarly if the extreme ∆ occurs at
q + ∆(1 − r) = 1. To prove one direction of (iii), the star-shaped property is satisfied by
convexity and is closed under taking minima. To prove the other direction, every g-function
that is star-shaped at 0 and 1 is the minimum over q of special convex g-functions, maxima
of two linear functions with breakpoint at (q, g(q)).
After defining the notion of semi convexity and the property of being a simplicity seeker,
we connect the two in Theorem 2, whose proof is the subject matter of Section 5
Theorem 2 If fµ,ν is semi-convex, Victor is a simplicity seeker with respect to Ursula,
regardless of (increasing) w.
It will become clear that
9
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Corollary 1 If fµ,ν ≤ g ≤ LEw for some semi-convex g, then Victor prefers safety more
than Ursula.
Corollary 2 A necessary and sufficient condition for increasing preference
for safety when fµ,ν is semi-convex. Let fµ,ν be semi-convex. Then Victor prefers
safety more than Ursula if and only if fµ,ν ≤ LEw.
Some remarks on RDU. Under risk, there is a probability measure P . RDU can be
viewed as CEU with µ = g(P ), ν = h(P ) so that fµ,ν(·) = h(g−1(·)). Victor, a RDU DM
characterized by (v, h), is dichotomous weakly risk averse (prefers safety to dichotomous
acts under risk) if and only if he is weakly more dichotomous risk averse than risk neutral
Ursula (u and g linear), i.e., if and only if h ≤ LEv.
Since lower envelope functions are bounded from above by the identity function, a
necessary condition for dichotomous weak risk aversion (thus, for weak risk aversion) in the
RDU model is that the DM be pessimistic, i.e., f(q) ≤ q , ∀q ∈ [0, 1] or, the probability
transformation function must be below the diagonal. As shown above, the lower envelope
function LEv is identically equal to the diagonal if and only if v is concave, and this
illustrates the well known result by Quiggin [24, 25] that for concave utility on wealth,
pessimism and weak risk aversion are equivalent. The probability transformation function
f is a functional measure of pessimism and the lower envelope function LEv is a functional
measure of greediness or non-concavity. Dichotomous risk aversion is characterized by
pointwise inequality between the two, much in the spirit of the comparison of the scalar
index of pessimism of f and the scalar index of greediness of v introduced by Chateauneuf,
Cohen & Meilijson [9], that characterize monotone risk aversion.
Does dichotomous weak increased preference for safety imply increased
preference for safety? We conjectured that the self-zooming property implies semi
convexity. If this were true, by Proposition 1(v) and Corollary 1, the inequality fµ,ν ≤ LEw
would have fully characterized increased preference for safety, at least for differentiable w
defined on a compact interval. Extensive numerical work based on millions of randomly
simulated examples failed to produce a counterexample, but neither could we prove the
conjecture. This question was settled once a connection was made to Dubins & Savage
gambling theory and the remarkable fact that a function g is self-zooming if and only if there
is a subfair casino with fixed goal for which g is the ”casino function”, or optimal probability
10
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of winning, as a function of initial wealth. As it turns out, Red & Black casino functions
provide counterexamples, not only to the technical question of whether the self-zooming
property implies semi convexity, but also to the fundamental question as to whether the
inequality fµ,ν ≤ LEw that characterizes dichotomous weak increased preference for safety,
also characterizes weak increased preference for safety.
Before proving Theorem 2, we digress to gambling theory and exhibit a counterexample
to the more general conjecture.
3 Some background on Dubins & Savage [15] casino theory
Casino. A primitive casino Γr with (loss) rate r specifies the collection Γr(x) of dichotomous
gambles available at every move to a player with wealth x ∈ (0, 1). These gambles permit
the player to choose the stake α ∈ [0, xr ]. On this move, if initial wealth is x, final wealth
is either x − rα or x + (1 − r)α. Thus, if the gamble is fair (subfair), the probability of
winning g(r) is r (strictly less than r). The primitive casino is fully specified by the pair
(r, g(r)). For our purposes, a casino Γ is a union (over r) of primitive casinos, specified by
the rate function g, assumed herein to be continuous, strictly increasing and strictly below
the identity function except for g(0) = 0 and g(1) = 1. In a primitive casino, the player can
choose the stake α. In a casino, the player can choose the stake α and the ”hole” r. In a
roulette table, the player can choose to play simultaneously a number of (stake, hole) pairs.
A move (α, r) is bold at x ≤ rr+1 if α = xr and at x ≥ rr+1 if α = 1−x1−r , in the sense that
at least one of the final wealth levels is 0 or 1. The strategy is bold if it only applies bold
moves.
Optimality and the self-zooming property. Let Ug(y) be the optimal probability of
reaching the goal from initial wealth y ∈ (0, 1), and let 0 < x < y < z < 1 with y−xz−x = q.
By optimality, an interim goal of reaching z versus x should be detrimental to chance of
winning. Since the optimal probability of reaching z rather than x is Ug(q), the following
inequality holds
Ug(y) ≥ Ug(q)Ug(z) + (1− Ug(q))Ug(x) (10)
in other words (see (9)), Ug satisfies the self-zooming property
Ug(q) ≤ Ug(y)− Ug(x)
Ug(z)− Ug(x) (11)
11
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By Theorem 4.2.1. in Dubins & Savage [15] (see also expression 4.2.8), self-zooming
functions are precisely those that can be obtained as the optimal probability Ug of reaching
the goal in subfair casinos.
4 The counterexample
Let Ug be the optimal probability of reaching the goal as a function of initial wealth,
as defined in the previous section. This function is thus self-zooming. Suppose that
Ursula is characterized by the pair (u, µ) and Victor by (v, ν), where v = Ug(u) and
ν = Ug(µ). In other words, Ug plays the double role of utility transfer function w and
capacity transformation function f . Since LEw ≥ f (because LEw = Ug = f), Victor is
dichotomous weakly more uncertainty averse than Ursula.
We will now see that for Ug of Red & Black, a specific casino, there is a 3-valued act
that Victor prefers to safety preferred by Ursula.
In casino language, Red & Black (see [15]) is the primitive casino with r = 12 and some
g(12) = ω ∈ (0, 12). The optimal probability (reached under bold play, the seminal result of
Dubins & Savage [15] for primitive casinos) of ever reaching the goal from 12 is U(
1
2) = ω,
then U(14) = U(
1
2)
2 = ω2 and U(34) = U(
1
2) + (1 − U(12))U(12) = ω + (1 − ω)ω. More
generally, U( k2n ) can be recursively expressed in terms of the corresponding probabilities
U( l2n−1 ). There is a unique monotone extension of U from the binary rationals in the unit
interval to the unit interval, so U is well defined.
The following table lists, for the case ω = 0.3, a few points and their U values as well
as their roles in building a distribution with values x1, x2, x3 and respective probabilities
1− q1, q1− q2, q2.
point * 2048 U role
0 0
2 5.9049 ∗ 10−6 x1
1024 0.3000 ω
1366 0.3800 x2
1537 0.5100 q2
1580 0.5154 > E[X]
1600 0.5232 q1
2048 1 x3
Let X be the 3-valued act with distribution ( 22048 , 0.4768 ;
1366
2048 , 0.0132 ; 1, 0.51). The
expectation of this distribution is E[X] = 0.7712 = 1579.5/2048 < 1580/2048. Hence, the
12
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utility at the expectation is less than U(1580/2048) = 0.5154, but RDU(X) is computed to
be 0.5182. In other words, Victor, dichotomous weakly more uncertainty averse than EU
Ursula, is not weakly more uncertainty averse than Ursula.
This exhibits an example of a self-zooming function that is not semi-convex. We leave
as an open problem the investigation of these functions. Attempts at bumping into one in
the street failed miserably:
Randomly sampled self-zooming functions. Continuous increasing functions u with
u(0) = 0 and u(1) = 1 may be randomly sampled by first sampling u(12) uniformly in the
unit interval, then sampling u(14) uniformly in (0, u(
1
2)) and u(
3
4) uniformly in (u(
1
2), 1),
etc., to the desired resolution, and then interpolating the definition piece-wise linearly.
Instead of using binary rational knots, it is also possible to use randomly sampled knots,
as investigated by Dubins & Freedman [14]. Once such a random piece-wise linear function
has been determined, it is possibly to compute accurately its lower envelope function, to
obtain a randomly sampled self-zooming function. This operation was repeated thousands
upon thousands of times with up to 128 knots, never ever producing a non semi-convex
function!
Furthermore, the function U listed above failed to produce a counterexample too, when
values of X and their probabilities were restricted to be multiples of 1/256. A Dynamic
Programming program designed to construct an optimal distribution for Victor exceeded
the computer’s memory when attempting multiples of 1/512...
As a consequence, it seems that ”most” cases of dichotomous weak increased uncertainty
aversion display general weak uncertainty aversion, but we have been unable to formalize
this feeling.
5 Proofs and further analysis
Theorem 2 will be proved first in RDU language. The proof will then be extended to cover
CEU. Consider a random variable X supported by x1 < x2 < · · · < xn with n ≥ 3 and
P (X > xi) = qi ; 1 ≤ i < n. It will be shown that there is another distribution, with the
same mean and support as X, except for missing one of the three leftmost atoms, leaving
all other atoms intact in value and probability, preferred by the DM. Analysis will be split
according to whether E[X|X ≤ x3] is to the left or to the right of x2.
13
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Case 1. E[X|X ≤ x3] ≥ x2. The removal of the atom x1 and the assignment
p1 = q2 − (1− q1)x2−x1x3−x2 entail the comparison
(1− f(q1))u(x1) + (f(q1)− f(q2))u(x2) + (f(q2)− f(q3)u(x3)) + · · ·
≤ (1− f(p1))u(x2) + (f(p1)− f(q3))u(x3) + · · · (12)
or
u(x2)− u(x1)
u(x3)− u(x1) ≥
f(q2)− f(p1)
1− f(q1) + f(q2)− f(p1) (13)
between two (objective) distributions with the same mean. Similarly, the removal of the
atom x2 and the assignment p2 = q1 x2−x1x3−x1 + q2(1− x2−x1x3−x1 ) entail, as before, the comparison
(1− f(q1))u(x1) + (f(q1)− f(q2))u(x2) + (f(q2)− f(q3)u(x3)) + · · ·
≤ (1− f(p2))u(x1) + (f(p2)− f(q3))u(x3) + · · · (14)
or
u(x2)− u(x1)
u(x3)− u(x1) ≤
f(p2)− f(q2)
f(q1)− f(q2) (15)
between distributions with equal means.
At least one of (13) and (15) is satisfied if and only if
f(q2)− f(p1)
1− f(q1) + f(q2)− f(p1) ≤
f(p2)− f(q2)
f(q1)− f(q2) (16)
In other words, if and only if
f(p2)− f(p1)
1− f(p1) ≤
f(p2)− f(q2)
f(q1)− f(q2) (17)
Inequality (17) is clearly satisfied when f is semi-convex: The LHS and RHS of (17) are
zooms of f around p2 with objective rate
r =
p2 − p1
1− p1 =
p2 − q2
q1 − q2 =
x2 − x1
x3 − x1 (18)
As such, the LHS of (17) is a maximal zoom-out of the RHS: fix p2, fix r and let q1 be defined
by (18) as a function of q2. Then, if f is semi-convex, the LHS of (17) is the minimum of
the RHS.
Case 2. E[X|X ≤ x3] ≤ x2. The removal of the atom x3 and the assignment
p3 = q1 + q2 x3−x2x2−x1 preserves means and entails the comparison
(1− f(q1))u(x1) + (f(q1)− f(q2))u(x2) + (f(q2)− f(q3)u(x3)) + · · ·
≤ (1− f(p3))u(x1) + (f(p3)− f(q3))u(x2) + (f(q3)− f(q3))u(x3) + · · · (19)
14
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or
(f(p3)− f(q1))(u(x1)− u(x2)) + f(q2)(u(x3)− u(x2)) ≤ f(q3)(u(x3)− u(x2)) (20)
Inequality (20) is satisfied for all q3 ≥ 0 if and only if it is satisfied for the most stringent
value q3 = 0, in which case the inequality becomes
u(x2)− u(x1)
u(x3)− u(x1) ≥
f(q2)
f(q2) + f(p3)− f(q1) (21)
As in case 1, at least one of (15) and (21) is satisfied if and only if
f(q2)
f(q2) + f(p3)− f(q1) ≤
f(p2)− f(q2)
f(q1)− f(q2) (22)
In other words, if and only if
f(p2)
f(p3)
≤ f(p2)− f(q2)
f(q1)− f(q2) (23)
This inequality is of the same nature as (17), satisfied by semi-convex f for the same reason.
The proof of Theorem 2 under RDU is essentially finished. We have seen that DMs with
semi-convex f always prefer some equal-mean distribution missing one of the three leftmost
atoms. The recursive application of this idea will end up with a preferred dichotomous
equal-mean distribution.
In CEU, with fµ,ν = f , express the Choquet index for Victor in terms of Ursula’s utility
on wealth ui = U(xi) and capacity qi = µ(Ai) as
V (X) = w(u1) + ν(A1)(w(u2)− w(u1)) + ν(A2)(w(u3)− w(u2) + · · ·
≤ w(u1) + f(q1)(w(u2)− w(u1)) + f(q2)(w(u3)− w(u2) + · · · (24)
Now apply the RDU result verbatim, with Ursula’s Choquet index U(X) playing the role
of expectation.
To prove Corollary 1 in RDU language, observe that by monotonicity of RDU with
respect to f , RDUu,f (X) ≤ RDUu,g(X). But g is semi-convex, so there is a dichotomous
act Y with E[Y ] = E[X] and RDUu,g(X) ≤ RDUu,g(Y ). Since (u, g) displays dichotomous
weak risk aversion, RDUu,g(Y ) ≤ u(E[Y ]) and RDUu,f (X) ≤ u(E[X]).
Corollary 2, the most conclusive result of this study, is an immediate consequence.
15
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6 Some examples
Example 1: a pair (w, f) displaying weak but not monotone risk aversion. If
w(x) = x2 on [0, 1] and f(p) = p2, the RDU DM is weakly risk averse because w is self-
zooming and identical to (convex) f .
The probability transformation function f(p) = p2. Its scalar index of pessimism
is Pf = infp
1−p2
p2
p
1−p = infp
1+p
p = 2. Thus, a DM with this probability transformation
function is monotone risk averse if and only if the marginal utility of one unit of money is
never more than twice what it would have been had the DM been poorer.
The utility function w(x) = x2 on [0,∞). Since this utility function is convex, the only
slopes to compare for the computation of the scalar index of greediness are the derivatives at
the endpoints of the interval of reference. On [0,∞) or even on [0, a] for positive but finite a,
this DM is so greedy on account of utility that the only possibility for being monotone risk
averse is infinite pessimism, given exclusively by the probability transformation function
with f(p) = 0 for all p < 1. Restriction to random variables supported by an interval with
positive endpoints will reduce greediness and make the DM more averse to risk. However,
as long as Gw > 2, this weakly risk averse DM is not monotone risk averse.
Example 2: Choquet Expected Utility. Consider three states of nature {1, 2, 3}.
Let Ursula be characterized by the pair (u, µ), where u(x) =
√
x and µ is the uniform
distribution on {1, 2, 3}. Let Victor be characterized by the pair (v, ν) given by v(x) = x
and a Choquet capacity ν that assigns mass 19 to every singleton and
4
9 to every two-point
set. We can see that w(x) = x2 and f can be taken as f(x) = x2. Hence, from the
previous example, (i) Victor is weakly more uncertainty averse than Ursula, even if the
utility function of Ursula is concave in that of Victor, and (ii) Victor is not monotone more
uncertainty averse than Ursula.
7 Concluding remark
In laboratory experiments it is easy to design questions that discriminate between attitudes
towards risk and attitudes towards ambiguity. This is no more the case in surveys based on
questions of everyday life choices. The notion of ”more preference for safety” applied in this
paper should allow a typology that classifies individuals into different categories according
to their degree of preference for safety, i.e., their degree of weak uncertainty aversion.
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